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Statement of the Case
Plaintiffs-Respondents Nora A. Mulberry and TN Properties LLC (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Mulberry") agree, for the most part, with the Statement of the
Case contained in Appellants' Brief. The various sections of Appellants' Statement of the
Case will be addressed in order below for ease of reference.

A.

Summary of the Case
This section primarily consists of argument, and as such, Mulberry disagrees with

this section. Mulberry agrees that the judgment was prepared by Mulberry, and that it
dismissed the all pending matters in the case. (R., p. 96). However, what Appellants fail to
mention is that the order upon which the judgment is based dismissed Mulberry's

remaining claims as moot. (R., p. 94 ). Mulberry had already been granted all the relief she
requested, rendering her additional claims moot. If the district court's Memorandum

Decision and Order Re: Motion/or Partial Summary Judgment ("1st MSJ Decision") and
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration ("2nd MSJ Decision")
are overturned by this Court, then Mulberry's remaining claims will no longer be moot.
Mulberry disagrees with the remainder of Appellant's Summary of the Case.

B.

Summary of the Proceedings in the District Court
Mulberry agrees with the fact stated in this section of Appellants' Brief.

C.

Summary of the Facts
Mulberry agrees with all numbered paragraphs of this section of Appellants' Brief

other than paragraphs 6 and 13.
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Mulberry disagrees with paragraph 6 to the extent it contains a selection of
provisions from the Right of First Refusal ("ROFR") which Appellants deem material, with
selective highlighting. Appellants' Brief, p. 5. The remainder of that paragraph consists of
argument. Id. Mulberry contends that the ROFR is a document which speaks for itself.
As to paragraph 13, Mulberry agrees that the Kirk Bums affidavit contains the
language set forth in Appellants' Brief. Appellants' Brief, p. 7. However, Mulberry
disagrees that such affidavit contains only facts. The last sentence of the second paragraph
and the entire third paragraph (as copied into Appellants' Brief) consist of opinion and/or
argument, with which Mulberry disagrees.
Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(5), 40, and 4l(a), Mulberry requests an
award of costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides that
costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.
Mulberry seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12120(3). That statute allows for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in a civil
action where the claim involves a commercial transaction. LC. § 12-120(3). This extends
to declaratory judgment actions. Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415,424,
111 P.3d 100, 109 (2005). Appellants have agreed that the claims in the instant matter
involve a commercial transaction. Appellants' Brief, p. 30. Therefore, if Mulberry prevails
on appeal, she will be entitled to her costs and fees on appeal.
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Argument
A.

The district court correctly held that the ROFR was personal to Canyon Cove
and was appurtenant to the Purchased Property.

Appellants argue that the district court's holding that "the ROFR was a servitude on
the ROFR Property that ran with the land" and its holding "that the ROFR was personal
and could not be assigned to Bums Concrete" are inconsistent. Appellants' Brief, p. 12. In
so arguing, Appellants point out that "'[p]ersonal' means that a servitude benefit or burden
is not transferable and does not run with the land." Appellants' Brief, p. 12 (internal
citations omitted). What Appellants fail to recognize is that they are conflating two distinct
holdings by the district court which are not at all inconsistent. The district court held that
(1) the burden of the ROFR constituted a servitude on the ROFR Property that runs with
the land; and (2) the benefit of the ROFR was personal to Canyon Cove and was
appurtenant to the Purchased Property. (R., pp. 58 & 92).
1.

The district court held that the "burden" of the ROFR runs with the
ROFR Property.

In its 1st MSJ Decision, the district court held that that although the ROFR was
personal to Canyon Cove as the grantee, it was not personal to Mulberry as the grantor,
and that therefore "TN Properties, as donee, would be held subject to the ROFR in the same
way that the Mulberrys were." (R., p. 60). In its 2nd MSJ Decision, the district court further
clarified that the ROFR constitutes a servitude and that the burden of that servitude runs
with the ROFR Property. (R., p. 85). In other words, the district court determined that the
Mulberrys could not unilaterally extinguish the ROFR by conveying the ROFR Property
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 7

to a company wholly owned by them (TN Properties LLC). Appellants have
(understandably) not challenged this holding. 1
In so holding, the district court noted the language of a comment to the Restatement
(Third) of Property (Servitudes), which states: "These terms [benefit and burden] indicate
only that some part of the covenant runs with some interest in land. They do not necessarily
mean that both burden and benefit run, nor do they mean that the burden or benefit will run
with all estates in the land or to all successors." (R., p. 84, quoting Restatement (Third) of
Property (Servitudes) § 1.3 (2000), Comment a.). The district court's holding that the

burden of the ROFR ran with the land (the ROFR Property), but that the benefit of the
ROFR was personal to Canyon Cove and appurtenant to the Purchased Property, is not
inconsistent.

1

Note that this does not mean that the ROFR will survive Nora Mulberry's death and a

subsequent demise of the ROFR property to her heirs or devisees. If that were the case, a
parcel of land could be passed down through a family for hundreds of years, with a ROFR
perpetually attached to the property, to spring into effect when an heir eventually decided
to sell. (Although this scenario would only come to pass if the ROFR expressly stated that
the benefit of the ROFR could be passed to the grantee's successors and assigns, which, as
will be discussed further below, is not the case here). In any event, that issue is not before
this Court.
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2.

The "benefit" of the ROFR was personal to Canyon Cove.

The district court correctly held that the benefit of the ROFR was personal to
Canyon Cove and could not be assigned to Bums Concrete.
The district court correctly started with the proposition that "[g]enerally all contract
rights which are not 'personal' in nature may be assigned." (R., p. 57, quoting Sinclair
Mktg., Inc. v. Siepert, 107 Idaho 1000, 1002, 695 P.2d 385, 387 (1985), quoting Williston

on Contracts (3d ed.)§ 412). The district court then went on to note that "[w]hether a right
of first refusal is personal in nature appears to be a case of first impression in Idaho." (R.,
p. 57). The district court relied on secondary sources (Am.Jur. and C.J.S.) to determine that
rights of first refusal should be interpreted as being personal in nature unless the contract
expressly states otherwise. (R., p. 57). Mulberry directs this Court's attention to those
sources as quoted in the district court's 1st MSJ Decision.
In addition, many courts around the country have held that the benefit of a right of
first refusal is personal in nature unless explicitly made assignable in the document. For
example, in Malone v. Flattery, the Court of Appeals of Iowa addressed the question for
the first time and determined that "a right of first refusal is generally personal to the party
who contracted for it absent language to the contrary." 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 110 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2011 ). The facts in that case were substantially similar to the facts in the case at
bar. After noting that "the prevailing rule in this country is that rights of first refusal are
not assignable unless the instrument indicates otherwise," the Iowa court went on to discuss
some of the policy reasons that underlie that "widespread assumption." Id. at *7. The court
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9

noted: "[Rights of first refusal] operate as a restraint on alienation, but unlike options do
so in an undefined and indefinite way. Options generally have a value that can be
ascertained; rights of first refusal may not. Because their very indefiniteness can impede
the marketability of real estate, it is logical to construe them narrowly." Id. The court
concluded: "Thus, it is fair to presume a party who grants a right of first refusal usually
intends to give the right to the grantee only." Id.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland discussed "the principle, applied in
numerous cases, that rights of first refusal are presumed to be personal and are not
ordinarily construed as transferable or assignable unless the particular cause granting the
right refers to successors or assigns or the instrument otherwise clearly shows that the right
was intended to be transferable or assignable." Park Station L.P. v. Bosse, 378 Md. 122,
137, 835 A.2d 646, 655 (Ct. App. 2003). The court went on to summarize similar holdings
from other jurisdictions:
See, e.g., Roemhild v. Jones, 239 F.2d 492, 495 (8th Cir.
1957) (The owner "could only offer the land for sale during his
lifetime. * * * There is no language in the reservation stating
that the [right of first refusal] runs to the heirs or
assignees"); Vogel v. Melish, 31 Ill. 2d 620,622, 624-625, 203
N.E.2d 411, 412-414 (1964) (Right of first refusal if owner
"desired to sell" is "a restraint on the alienation of the" property
"and consequently is to be strictly construed. * * * It is
unreasonable to assume that the parties intended it to survive
the death of either of them . . . when no provision for that
contingency is made in the agreement, other than the . . .
general terms of paragraph 6 [which was the same as paragraph
10 of the agreement in the present case]"); Barnhart v.
McKinney, 235 Kan. 511, 513, 519, 682 P.2d 112, 114, 119
(1984) (The contract contained a clause similar to paragraph
10 of the contract in the case at bar, and the court held that the
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right of first refusal could not "be passed on to the heirs and
assigns of the Barnharts," that "it was personal to the
Barnharts," and that, therefore, the "event [that] would trigger
[the] preemptive right of purchase [would occur] well within a
term not violative of the rule against perpetuities"); Fisher v.
Fisher, supra, 23 Mass. App. at 206, 500 N.E.2d at 822 (The
right of first refusal "was extinguished by William's death," as
the clause granting the right did "not contain words such as
heirs or assigns but speaks in personal terms"); Kershner v.
Hurlburt, 277 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Mo. 1955)("The instant
contract, reasonably construed, does not violate the rule against
perpetuities because the rights [of first refusal] conferred by it
are personal to the holders thereof and terminated at their
deaths"); Nickels v. Cohn, 764 S.W.2d 124, 132-133 (Mo. App.
1989) (Same); Bloomer v. Phillips, 164 A.D.2d 52, 55, 562
N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (1990); Old National Bank of Washington
v. Arneson, 54 Wn. App. 717, 723, 776 P.2d 145, 148
(1989) ("preemptive rights are generally construed to be
nontransferable"); Sweeney v. Lilly, 198 W.Va. 202, 205, 479
S.E.2d 863, 866 (1996); In the Matter of Wauka, Inc., 39 B.R.
734, 737-738 (N. D. Ga. 1984); Mitchell, Can A Right of First
Refusal Be Assigned?, supra, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 994;
3 Corbin On Contracts,§ 11.15 at 587 (Rev. Ed. 1996).
Id., 378 Md. at 137-138, 835 A.2d at 655.
This Court should follow the majority rule and hold that rights of first refusal are
personal and not assignable unless the agreement creating the right of first refusal expressly
states otherwise. In the instant case, this means that the ROFR was personal to Canyon
Cove and was not assignable to Bums Concrete. The ROFR could have included language
stating that it was assignable (or binding on each party's heirs, successors, and assigns), as
contracts in Idaho often do. It did not include such language.
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3.

The "benefit" of the ROFR was appurtenant to the Purchased
Property.

Servitudes, such as rights of first refusal, can be either appurtenant or in gross.
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 1.5 (2000). This can apply to either the
benefit or the burden of a servitude, or both. Id. at Comment a. A servitude is appurtenant
"if it serves a purpose that would be more useful to a successor to a property interest held
by the original beneficiary of the servitude at the time the servitude was created than it
would be to the original beneficiary after transfer of that interest to a successor." Id. at §
4.5(l)(a).

In the instant case, the "original beneficiary" of the ROFR, Canyon Cove, obtained
a property interest in the Purchased Property at the same time as the execution of the ROFR.
It seems obvious that the ROFR on the ROFR Property would be "more useful" to a
subsequent owner of the Purchased Property than it would be to Canyon Cove after it no
longer owned the Purchased Property. "More useful" is an extremely broad phrase. There
are numerous ways in which property across the street and one parcel over from a person's
own property would be "more useful" to that person than to someone not owning any
property nearby.
Appellants note that "this Court has resorted to Idaho's law applicable to easements
m deciding whether other rights related to property are" appurtenant or in gross.
Appellants' Brief, p. 17. Appellants cite Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States of America,
in which this Court "reasoned by analogy from appurtenant easements, holding that water
rights and easements were sufficiently similar to have the relevant law applicable to
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 12

appurtenant easements apply to appurtenant water rights." 144 Idaho 1, 13, 156 P.3d 502,
514 (2007). Based on that, Appellants argue that this Court should apply to rights of first
refusal the rule applicable to easements: that they are appurtenant if they "serve[] the owner
of that land in a way that cannot be separated from his rights in the land." Appellants' Brief,
p. 18, quoting Abbott v. Nampa School District No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 550, 808 P.2d
1289, 1295 (1991).
Appellants' argument is not well-founded. Unlike with water rights, there has been
no holding by this Court that rights of first refusal are sufficiently similar to easements to
reason by analogy and apply the same concepts to rights of first refusal as to easements.
Both easements and water rights give a holder of land the right to enter onto and use
property of another for certain purposes. A right of first refusal gives the holder no right to
access or use the burdened parcel. It simply means that they may have a right to buy it in
the future if certain conditions are met. The general "more useful" rule applicable to
servitudes makes more sense in the context of a right of first refusal than does the "cannot
be separated from his rights in the land" rule applicable to easements. Accordingly, this
Court should find that the ROFR in this matter was appurtenant to the Purchased Property,
and that it was no longer exercisable by Canyon Cove after it sold the Purchased Property.
Because the ROFR was personal to Canyon Cove, the assignment of the ROFR to
Bums Concrete is void. Bums Concrete cannot exercise the ROFR. Because the ROFR is
appurtenant to the Purchased Property and Canyon Cove divested itself of that property,
Canyon Cove also cannot exercise the ROFR. The district court's decisions on summary
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judgment and the motion for reconsideration should be upheld by this Court.

B.

The district court correctly held that the Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties
and properly awarded Plaintiffs their fees and costs.
Appellants argue that Mulberry did not prevail before the district court because a

judgment was entered dismissing her claims. Appellants' Brief, p. 30. Appellants fail to
mention that the judgment was based on an underlying order finding that Mulberry's
"remaining claims" were moot. (R., p. 94). Mulberry's "remaining claims" were moot
precisely because she had already obtained the relief she sought in her Complaint - that
the ROFR could not be exercised by Defendants-Appellants.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(B) states that "[i]n determining which party
to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought
by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). "The determination of who is a prevailing
party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and [appellate courts] will not
disturb that determination absent an abuse of discretion." Lower Payette Ditch Co. v.

Harvey, 152 Idaho 291, 295-296, 271 P.3d 689, 693-694 (2012). In determining whether
or not the trial court has abused its discretion, Idaho appellate courts analyze: "(l) whether
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court
acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason." Farm Credit Bank v. Wissel, 122 Idaho 565, 568, 836
P.2d 511,514 (1992).
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In this case, the district court recognized that the determination of who was the
prevailing party was within the discretion of the Court. (R., p. 123). The court reviewed
case law and then proceeded to reason and hold: "This Court's declaration that the ROFR
was extinguished and non-binding was in accordance with the relief sought by Plaintiffs.
Although Plaintiffs' complaint was, upon Plaintiffs' motion, thereafter dismissed as moot,
Defendants cannot be said to have prevailed in the matter. Plaintiffs ultimately received
the result they sought - a determination that the ROFR was not assignable." (R., p. 129).
The district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. The award of
attorney fees and costs should be affirmed.
Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Mulberry respectfully requests that the Court affirm the
district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment, Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration, and
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Attorney Fees and Costs. Mulberry also respectfully
requests an award of her attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of April, 2018.
CAREY ROMANKIW, PLLC

By·=-------'-'--~~ ~'----''-------'-----=:.r..,.:.,.._,.,_._.,_'-=-~~~
Lindsey
Attorne 'for Plaintiffs-Respondents
Nora A. Mulberry and TN Properties LLC
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